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Assessing the Legacy of Communism:
Continuities and Discontinuities
in the East-Central European Transitions III

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Abstract

Based on six national representative surveys conducted in Hungary in between 1977 and 1997 using the Rokeach value test, this article tries to assess the extent to which the communist period left a 'stamp' on the preferences of basic human values. The results show that classical socialist values like EQUALITY, WORK and SOCIAL RECOGNITION decisively lost ground after 1989, while the group of collective security values considered as the official values of the communist regime (NATIONAL SECURITY, WORLD AT PEACE), though regained importance by 1993, receded again by 1996 at the latest. However, apart from the growth of importance by the values directly opposed to these two groups of socialist values, according to our data no coherent new value group emerged after 1989 that could give direction and cohesion to the new socio-political order.

KEY WORDS: values, Rokeach, Weber, communism, liminality, reflexivity.

Introduction

The momentous changes of 1989 almost immediately posed two questions that the social science literature concerned does not cease to return to since. How come that the voluminous literature on communist regimes failed to predict the radicality and suddenness of these changes (Lipset and Bence 1994)? And how come that once the communist regimes collapsed and the Red Army retired to Russia, the legacy of the Communist Party keeps haunting almost all the countries that, so it was thought, were finally liberated from its spell (Holmes 1997, Horváth and Szakolczai 1992, Janos 1994, Mokrzycki 1992, Neumann 1996, Schöpflin 1993, Tismaneanu 1992, Verdery 1996)? The two questions are closely related, forming a tight paradox. How a radical and unforeseen change could have happened, asks the first. And how is it in the midst of all those changes, so many things remained the same, asks the second.

This combination of discontinuity and continuity helped first to partially answer and then to reformulate one of the most vexing problems concerning these regimes, the extent to which the communist ideology and politics succeeded to indoctrinate the populace under its grip. According to the heroic stories, based on the 1956 of Budapest, the 1968 of Prague or the 1980 of Gdansk, the self-organising civil society fiercely resisted the onslaught of the state and the Party, and raised its voice whenever it got a chance. (1) However, this account was opposed and contested from another side, by intellectuals, poets and analysts who claimed, almost since the establishment of the regimes, that far from being simply an external dictatorship, communism managed to transform in depth the countries it took control of. (2)

On a first look, the fact and the character of the changes seemed to refute definitely the picture of the 'homo sovieticus' (Zinoviev 1981). However, the everpresence of the lasting legacy of the past suggests a somewhat different scenario. The paradox concerning the success or failure of communist impregnation keeps haunting the present, just as it did the past.

However, if a problem cannot be solved, the reason may be that the question was badly posed. In such cases, the solution is not to be gained by a synthesis of the different suggestions but through a reformulation of the problem or the question. In the case of the impact of communism, this lies through a differentiation between the direct, manifest and indirect, latent impact of regime. The direct impact concerns adherence to the ideology of the

regime on its own terms, a spontaneous, from below reproduction of existing socialism, an Orwellian love of Big Brother. The events of the past decade demonstrated beyond doubt that this did not happen. However, the lasting legacy can be shown to exist on another, less accessible, more latent, but nevertheless just as real level: not in ideologies and explicit goals, but in mentalities; not in the content but the form and modality of behaviour; not in concrete, formal institutions and organisations but in attitudes and values related to institutions and the very process of institutionalisation.

A distinction between the manifest and the hidden is relatively easy to make as a matter of principle. It can also rely upon the support of a long intellectual tradition, particularly present in German philosophical idealism, in the opposition of the hidden essence to the mere surface of phenomena. This paper, however, would use as a reference point a quite different type of literature: the emphasis in phenomenological sociology, and related approaches, on the taken for granted (Schutz 1962), the frame (Goffman 1986, Bateson 1972), or the background (Gadamer 1975, Searle 1992: 175). In these approaches, the unseen is not the hidden essence, only the aspect of behaviour - sometimes its most trivial aspect - that is not visible due to its very closeness and familiarity. In this perspective, the hidden and lasting legacy of the former regime concerns not something related to the essence of communist ideology of organisation, but the boring, trivial, routine aspects of behaviour that to its practitioners is taken for granted as given, evident, matter of fact, natural and universal, part of the way things have to be done, and by no means connected to the specific legacy of communism.

Such a perspective also helps to connect values to actual, regular everyday practices, the conduct of life.

On values

It is widely agreed that the legacy of the past is particularly strong at the level of political culture, intellectual traditions, ingrained mentalities; in one word, at the level of values (Schöpflin 1993, Kennedy 1994). It is therefore not surprising that the question of the failure or success of communist indoctrination was at the centre of those empirical studies that tried to map the social value system in the post-communist countries after 1989.

Such studies can be divided into two broad groups. One is focusing on political culture and political values, and is especially interested in the question of the meaning of democracy and the potential of a successful

democratic transformation after decades of communist rule (Bruszt and Simon 1992, Miller *et al.* 1997, Reisinger *et al.* 1994, Simon 1995). The other has a more general orientation, targeting basic human values (Bardi and Schwartz 1996, Broek and Moor 1993, Schwartz and Bardi 1997). However, both approaches share two common dilemmas, related to the assessment of the communist legacy. One is theoretical, and is concerned with the proper conceptualisation of the lasting legacy of the past regime. The question is the identification of the exact level in which the survivals of the past are supposed to lie. The empirical dilemma is posed by the lack of longitudinal data (Schwartz and Bardi 1997: 385). This paper intends to alleviate both dilemmas by presenting a theoretical framework for the study of survivals at the level of values that effectively guide behaviour, and by presenting results from an empirical study of values, using data from six representative national surveys done in Hungary between 1977 and 1997. (3)

As the theoretical underpinning of an empirical study of individual values, the paper will rely upon Max Weber's sociology of religions, especially his 1915 'Introduction' to the first published essays. (4)

In the classical paradigms of value sociology, values either exist as overarching and binding social norms, located at the level of the collectivity and not amenable to micro-level individual analysis (this idea goes back at least to Parsons 1968), or they are assumed to reside in basic individual needs, and are universal for every human being (the classic statement of this view is by Maslow 1959). The Weberian argument is opposed to both positions. According to it, values are to be studied at the level of individuals, and not collective entities. They are related to the manner in which individuals actually conduct their life (*Lebensführung*). However, this is not due to a prior positive or normative assumption, characteristic of methodological individualism, but is related to an empirical fact, even urgency. The conduct of life only becomes connected to values once the formerly taken for granted forms of behaviour become problematic.

Such a phenomenon becomes socially relevant if it occurs at the same time for a number of individuals. This happens in rare moments when the existing order of things is dissolved (Voegelin 1978: 89-115), in moments of transition (Borkenau 1976, Elias 1983, 1994), or in suspended or 'liminal' periods (van Gennep 1960, Victor Turner 1967, 1969). As in such periods the stable reference points break down, individuals are left on their own to provide stability and guidance to their own life. The different value orders of which a social value system is composed today bear the 'stamps' (Weber 1948:

268-80, Elias 1983: 39-40) of such moments of dislocation. In the words of Weber, "[n]ot ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest." (Weber 1948: 280).

The suspension of order, or the 'liminal' condition, however, does not merely 'stamp' the individuals who suffer the pains and pressures of such periods. Quite the contrary, these force individuals to take a step back from their routine activities, stimulating the work of thought, or reflexivity (Elias 1987, Bourdieu 1990, Voegelin 1978: 11-2). Under highly fluid and instable periods of transition, the work of thought is not restricted to the reflection of existing social or political structures in ideas or representations — as such stable structures were already suspended; rather it is the reflexive activity of thought that contributes to the stamping of those structures and identities, both mental and institutional, social and individual, that eventually would become the repository of order and become taken for granted — until further notice.

Values, therefore, are not identical to (supra-individual) norms, the consensual principles widely shared in a given society. Neither are they rooted in (sub-individual) needs, the biological or physiological urges that are shared by all human beings. They are rather related to the way individuals conduct their life, being effective maxims guiding behaviour that become accessible once they are problematised again through the reflexive work of thought.

Values understood in this sense can be analysed at the individual level, even through sociological surveys. However, this requires the use of a special, reflexive approach that is not usually applied in opinion polls. Surveys are interested either in actual behaviour (where the question is whether the respondent reports truthfully what s/he has done), or in attitudes (where the information is merely a sudden reaction to a quick impulse). Surveys are not interested in posing questions to respondents for which they need to pause and reflect for some minutes to answer. Such an approach is ruled out by simple considerations of cost.

There is, however, a value test that was specifically developed for an in-depth, reflexive analysis of individual values. It was worked out by the Polish-born American social psychologists, Milton Rokeach. Based on years of clinical experimentation, Rokeach (1973) developed a set of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values that, according to him, mapped the entire span of

values (see Appendix). Rokeach had an explicitly reflexive orientation. He asked respondents to rank from 1 to 18 both sets of values, comparing and contrasting, in principle, each and every pair of values. As a result, the filling out of this test requires at least 15-20 minutes per respondents, making its costs all but prohibitive for ordinary survey research. However, it is widely acknowledged that the Rokeach test is a particularly sensitive and reliable instrument to map in depth the core values held by individuals (Feather 1975, Feldman 1988, Schwarz 1994). (5)

Data and methods

The Rokeach test was asked on fully representative national samples by the Centre for Value Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, led by Elemér Hankiss, in 1977-8, 1982, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1997. The samples sizes were 807, 2938, 1320, 1538, 1500 and 1500, while those filling out the test correctly were 677, 2089, 1063, 1150, 1327 and 1347, respectively. In this paper, we will focus on changes in the average preferences for the different values by the whole population, using two-tailed t-tests and analysis of variance.

Background information

In order to facilitate the interpretation of simultaneous changes in a set of 36 values covering a span of 20 years, three sets of additional information will be given here, relying on previous studies and other type of data analyses. They have a semantic, social and systemic character.

Semantic information

Though the aim of Rokeach was to develop two sets of 18 values that are independent in meaning from each other and that cover the entire value span, it is clear that the meaning of some is closer than of others, while certain values stand opposed to each other. These similarities and differences can be analysed by the use of multivariate statistical methods like factor analysis. Such studies reveal, for example, an intimate connection between a series of ideological values like PEACE, NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM and EQUALITY, and their opposition to such materialistic or hedonistic values like WELL-BEING, PLEASURE and COMFORTABLE LIFE. For illustration of

both substance and method, Table 1 contains the relevant factor loadings of the first principal component for the six Hungarian observation years, and also for the American data. The first principal component can be best conceived of as the main cleavage dividing the value system of a given society.

Social information

The meaning of values, and especially their preference, also has a strong social component. There is a difference between preferences according to age, gender, occupation, and especially education. We also analysed special subsamples like university students, managers, people educated at special communist party schools, or gipsies. These studies add a further perspective to the interpretation of changes in the overall preference for certain values. For example, the extremely strong preference for PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY by those educated at special Communist party schools identified these values as the core of the official socialist values (Szakolczai 1987), while WORK, SOCIAL RECOGNITION and SELF-RESPECT are rather the classical socialist or social-democratic values that had a close semantic affinity, according to the results of factor analysis, and are preferred mostly by male skilled workers.

Systemic information

Apart from identifying certain values with their 'carrier strata' (Weber 1948), a contrast between the Hungarian results of 1977-78 and the American data for 1968, and also between the respective factor structures, helps to identify some of the peculiarities of the Hungarian value preferences (see Figures 1 and 2).

1. In Hungary, it was possible to distinguish the presence of a value order that did not appear in the American sample: a 'classical' socialist or social democratic value order, centering upon the three values of SOCIAL RECOGNITION, WORK, and SELF-RESPECT. These values formed a separate factor in Hungary, while no comparable factor existed in the US. Also, two of these values, WORK and SOCIAL RECOGNITION were on the

average much more important in Hungary than in the US. This was not true for SELF-RESPECT which in the States had a different contextual meaning.

2. However, this was not the sole, not even the major specific value order in Hungary that deserved the 'socialist' label. Another compact set of values, consisting of NATIONAL SECURITY, PEACE, EQUALITY, and FREEDOM, could be called, in distinction to the previous, classical socialist values, the 'official' or 'ideological' socialist values. These were the values, especially the first two, that left a particularly strong mark on value preferences in the Hungarian sample. This is reflected first in population averages. PEACE was by far the most important value in Hungary in 1977-78, and NATIONAL SECURITY was almost four points higher on average in Hungary than in the US. As it was mentioned above, the source of this emphasis can safely be located in the communist party apparatus.

The two values of PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY also had a singular importance in the structure of value preferences, being present in the first two principal components, and in three of the five rotated factors. Both these findings have their relevance. The first two principal components, reflecting the major value cleavages within the sample, contained both terminal and instrumental values, indicating that these were the ideological, official socialist values that connected ends and means at the level of social consciousness. The large role of these values in defining the rotated factor structure, on the other hand, indicates the everpresence of ideological considerations even in the finer divisions in the structure of the value system.

3. Apart from the two different socialist value orders, there was another group of values much more preferred by Hungarians than Americans. These were the intellectual values (INTELLECTUAL, IMAGINATIVE, and LOGICAL). These are at the bottom of the ranking of instrumental values in the States, while in Hungary, they are much more preferred, by 2.5 to 4 points on the average. This finding reinforces views that stressed the strongly intellectual character of the former socialist systems (Bauman 1987, Konrád and Szelényi 1979). Such a link between intellectual values and ideology is also supported by the fact that the first unrotated factor, defining the most important division of the social value system, contained these two value orders together on one of its axis (see Table 1).

4. Opposed to the official socialist value order, as represented by one pole of the second rotated factor in 1977-78, there is a mixed set of values: FAMILY, LOVE, LOVING, HAPPINESS, INNER HARMONY, and WELL-BEING. These values in general belong to quite different value orders, correlation among them being not particularly strong. Thus, LOVE is strongly correlated with FRIENDSHIP, WELL-BEING with PLEASURE, INNER HARMONY with WISDOM, LOVING with FORGIVING. Yet, this factor contains only one member of these pairs. The only common characteristics uniting them is negative: they all belong to the private sphere and are opposed to the official socialist values of the public sphere. As opposed a rigid, ideological orientation, they emphasize human relations and emotions (LOVE, LOVING, HAPPINESS), a turn to small community (FAMILY), to the inner side of personality (INNER HARMONY), or to material comforts (WELL-BEING).

Perhaps due to this extra emphasis, these values in general are more important in Hungary than in the US. This is even more true if contrasted with their "twin" values. Thus, WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS are about 1.5 ranking points ahead in Hungary, INNER HARMONY and LOVE by two points, while FRIENDSHIP is at the same level, and WISDOM a full six points behind. LOVING, the only member of the group preferred more in the US, is two and a half points behind in Hungary, while its pair, FORGIVING is four and a half points.

Of these, according to the contrast between the preferences of respondents with or without party membership in 1977-78, LOVE, FAMILY and INNER HARMONY can be most identified as 'dissident' values (Szakolczai 1987).

5. The largest difference between Hungary and the US is, not surprisingly, in religious values. SALVATION is one of the highest ranked terminal values in the States, while it is by far the last in Hungary, the difference being a full nine points in medians. There is a similar difference in the two instrumental values already mentioned above, LOVING and especially FORGIVING. It is important to note here that these values are not strictly religious, but are in general related to concrete interpersonal relations, communal life. The very low preference accorded to them in Hungary indicates not only a lack of religiosity, but also a lack of attention given to such considerations. This reading is all the more plausible as these two instrumental values, in both Hungary and the US, take up the opposite pole of the intellectual values.

6. The final contrast concerns the pragmatic values. Whether belonging semantically to the intellectual values (like CAPABLE), or the materialist values (like AMBITION), these were ranked considerably higher in the American sample.

These results provides us with a sharp initial picture. In Hungary, there is on the one hand a strong preference for ideological values and a downplaying of religion; on the other, a marked emphasis on intellectualisation at the expense of its conceptual counterpart, the values of sociability and interpersonal relations. Both the ideologisation and the intellectualisation are coupled with a relative absence of pragmatism. The question concerns extent to which these patterns were changing after 1989.

General hypotheses

The central assertion this paper wants to test is that communism exerted a very substantive and lasting, though mostly indirect, latent, hidden impact on society, and on value preferences. This claim can first be translated into two negative claims. One is that there was no comprehensive and basic reversal at the level of individual value preferences towards the elimination of the fundamental difference with respect to the pattern exhibited by the 1968 American values. Some of the outstanding peculiarities of the values preferences of Hungary as manifested in the late 1970s would therefore persist in the mid-1990s as well. The other assertion, however, is that there were nevertheless significant dislocations at the level of value preferences as compared to the communist period, refuting any substantive continuity, especially in so far as the most exposed socialist or communist values are concerned.

These claims in themselves only assert a combination of continuities and discontinuities before and after 1989 that in itself would be a fairly trivial idea. They will therefore be complemented with a second set of more positive general hypotheses. They will be related to the clarification of the distinction between direct vs. indirect, or manifest vs. latent differences. First, it will be argued that changes will be greater concerning the terminal than the instrumental values. Terminal values are explicitly stated life-goals, while instrumental values are related to the modality of action and behaviour. Terminal values have a higher degree of visibility and immediacy, are closer to the surface of consciousness, while instrumental values are closer to

ingrained habits, the modality of the conduct of life (Mumford 1952, Weber 1995) or the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Elias 1991). It will therefore be assumed that 1989 would hardly represent a major dislocation concerning the instrumental values, while there would be much more basic changes in the average preference of terminal values.

We would expect, however, considerable differences among the terminal values as well, and first of all again along the same dimension of latency and immediacy, concerning now the relationship to the established socialist or communist values. Thus, as a second general hypothesis, we assert that in the average preference for those values that clearly and substantively were committed to the classical socialist ideology, there would be a radical difference between all pre- and the post-1989 data. The third general hypothesis concerns the temporary nostalgia characteristic of the years 1993-94, marked by the spectacular electoral victories of the post-communist parties in elections dominated by economic issues (Fitzmaurice 1995, Szélenyi *et al.* 1997, Tworzecki 1994). It will be assumed that this swing of mood should be reflected in changes in the preference for those values that were most closely associated with a general feeling of support or opposition with the communist regime. Finally, fourth, it will be assumed that after 1989, apart from a general trend towards materialism and hedonism, the data would confirm the common wisdom that no new political ideas emerged in the region after 1989 (Vachudová and Snyder 1997: 1) and that there is no sign of a consistent, coherent new value system that would represent a significant reversal and renewal as compared to the previous patterns of value preferences. Furthermore, it will be assumed that the increase of materialism in terminal values will not be correlated with a similar increase in the preference for pragmatic instrumental values.

Operationalised hypotheses

On the basis of these general theoretical considerations, a set of 10 hypotheses will now be formulated that break down these broad concerns into concrete suggestions related to change in the preferences for the different value groups, or even individual values.

Hypothesis 1. Concerning the classical socialist values, the hypothesis is simple: there must be a radical and irreversible break in the average preferences between and after 1989. Such a change should be exhibited by all

three of the social democratic values, but especially by WORK and SOCIAL RECOGNITION; while among the ideological values, the same must be true for EQUALITY that is semantically closest to this group.

Hypothesis 2. We also expect the official socialist values, especially the most exposed values PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, to lose importance. This, however, should manifest a different pattern. In between 1982 and 1990, the break should be similar to that of the classical socialist values, though perhaps less steep. Between 1990 and 1993, however, we expect a significant reversal that could even amount to a return to the pre-1990 level. By 1996, however, the post-communist bandwagon, according to all signs, has ended in Hungary, just as in the other countries of the regions, as the heirs of the former communist parties also lost their innocence in the new system. Thus, by 1996, we expect a basic return to the 1990 levels, and it should be maintained in 1997 as well.

Hypothesis 3. We would expect that the exact same pattern would be exhibited, though in the opposite direction, by the loose agglomerate of dissident values. Thus, preference for the values FAMILY, INNER HARMONY and LOVE should increase considerably in 1990, decrease again in 1993, while increase again in 1996 and keep level in 1997.

Hypothesis 4. Concerning the projected rise in materialism and hedonism, we shall assume in line with our fourth general hypothesis that the terminal values related to material comfort, PLEASURE and especially WELL-BEING, will considerably gain importance after 1989. However, we do not foresee a similar gain in the average preferences for the semantically related pragmatic value of AMBITIOUS. As for the hedonistic values like HAPPINESS, EXCITING LIFE and CHEERFUL, we expect roughly similar changes as those happening with the materialist values, also due to the semantic closeness between the two sets.

Hypothesis 5. One of the most striking contrasts between the 1977-78 Hungarian and the 1968 American value choices was in the preferences for intellectual values. Though one could argue that such a huge difference should have been attenuated after the changes, especially as the importance of the educated elite and of the written word, so characteristic of the former regimes, all but disappeared, we would expect no major changes here, in line

with the assumption concerning the continuity at the level of 'habitus', the instrumental values. We also formulate two further, minor hypotheses concerning the intellectual values. One is related to the strong ties between the official socialist and the intellectual values, due to the 'stamping effect' of the former regime. Thus, given the post-communist nostalgia, one could even expect a relative increase in the preference for intellectual values in 1993. Second, we do not expect similar changes in the semantically related pragmatic value, CAPABLE.

Hypothesis 6. The greatest, though not at all surprising, difference between the Hungarian and American value preferences concerned the religious values. As it is well-known, there was little increase in religiosity in Hungary after 1989, in spite of the efforts of the first post-1989 government. Such a finding also follows from our fourth general hypothesis, according to which materialism and hedonism are the only new developments in values after 1989. We would therefore expect at most a mild increase in the average preference of SALVATION, with a perceivable drop around the year 1993.

Hypothesis 7. We expect, however, a distinctly different pattern to be shown by a semantically very close group of instrumental values, those encompassing interpersonal relations and community life. Apart from FORGIVING, values like LOVING and HELPFUL belong here, that are semantically opposite to the intellectual values. These characteristics were much more appreciated in the United States, except for HELPFUL that, with its socialist-collectivist connotations, was more important in Hungary. In light of our general hypotheses, we expect no increase in the average preference for these values in Hungary after 1989. Quite the contrary, it is assumed, in light of projected loss of substantive socialist values, that even HELPFUL would lose its relative edge in Hungary.

Hypothesis 8. The other group of instrumental values opposed semantically to the intellectual values are the traditional-disciplinary values of OBEDIENT, CLEAN and POLITE. These values have much less substantive content than the interpersonal and community values. Therefore, it will be assumed that there will be no definite directionality in the changes of preferences which, if occurring, should inversely mirror the oscillations in the preferences for the intellectual values.

Hypothesis 9. This hypothesis will be a control hypothesis, attempting to confirm the general validity of our results. While most hypotheses predicted changes and discontinuities, some were about continuities, of the communist patterns. There is, however, a distinct group of values where we would expect strong continuities, without evoking a communist legacy. These are the ethical-stoic values of COURAGEOUS, HONEST, RESPONSIBLE, SELF-CONTROLLED and FRIENDSHIP. These values, especially the central moral values of HONEST and RESPONSIBLE, are so generally acknowledged in any contemporary society than one would expect no significance change in their selection in between any of the years. A fundamental overall stability in their selection is therefore a control for the reliability of the method employed.

Hypothesis 10. Finally, there is a group of well-defined values, the contemplative personality values of WISDOM, BEAUTY and INNER HARMONY that are related to the self and not to others, and possess an aesthetical rather than ethical element. For these, no coherent hypothesis can be formed based on the general hypotheses. It will therefore be assumed that changes in them, if at all happening, will not follow a consistent pattern, as opposed to all the other groups, but each of them will follow the pattern of those other group to which they are semantically closest. Thus, INNER HARMONY would behave as in general the values that are part of the dissident values; BEAUTY will be closest to the type of change characteristic of the hedonistic values, while WISDOM will move together with the intellectual values.

Results

Most of the results used for assessing the hypotheses are contained in Table 2. First of all it includes the average preferences for the 36 values in the six observation years. Second, in between the averages of neighbouring observations for a particular value, one, two or three stars appear if, according to two tailed t-tests, the changes in preferences between these two years were significant at the 0.05, 0.01 or 0.001 levels. Third, the significance levels for an analysis of variance for all six observations taken together are given. Finally, the last column of the Table indicates whether the changes throughout the almost twenty-year period were linear, going into a single

direction. Figures 3 and 4 represent the basic data separately for the 18 terminal and instrumental values.

In the following first the operationalised hypotheses will be assessed, while the general hypotheses will be examined after.

Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis, according to which 1989 should represent for all the classical socialist values a single and sustained break, is fully borne out by the data. Concerning all three values of the classical socialist or social democratic value group, WORK, SOCIAL RECOGNITION and SELF-RESPECT, the average preference for each post-communist year is lower than for the communist period, and in almost all cases the difference is significant and even substantive. The same is true for the most classically socialist value of the official or ideological socialist value group, EQUALITY. In a way, the results are even clearer. The two values for which the break is the most pronounced, SOCIAL RECOGNITION and EQUALITY, are exactly the values that were semantically the closest to each other from the two different value groups. Thus, we could state that the receding of the socialist value system is the strongest at the point of intersection of the classical and official socialist values.

Hypothesis 2. The behaviour of the two terminal values most associated with the communist regime, NATIONAL SECURITY and PEACE is also fully in line with the expected pattern. Their preference was highest in 1977-78 and 1982, during the communist period, and in 1993, at the time of the post-communist nostalgia. In 1990, however, there was a significant drop in importance, and the 1996 and 1997 averages returned to these levels. The hypothesis therefore that the reversal of 1993-94 was only temporary and that there is no continuity before and after 1989 at the level of the values most clearly associated with the former system stands confirmed.

Hypothesis 3. The twin hypothesis about the former 'dissident' values of the private sphere is also borne out by the data, with almost perfect geometrical precision. Whenever the official socialist values recede, the three values of FAMILY, INNER HARMONY and LOVE move forward, and whenever the former gain importance, the latter is weakened (see Figure 5). Concerning mere changes in numbers, we can only confirm the parallelism. However, concerning the meaning and the driving force of these changes, we can say more, risking elements of a causal explanation. The semantic links between

FAMILY, INNER HARMONY and LOVE are quite weak. In the American sample, they never belonged on the same pole of a factor (Rokeach 1973: 47). They were only brought together in Hungary by their joint opposition to the socialist collective or public values. Therefore it can safely be assumed that the relative importance in their preference only follows and imitates the shifts in the official socialist values. The dynamism, the driving force behind these changes lies solely with the socialist values — whether it is a matter of a gain or a loss of importance.

Hypothesis 4. The data also confirm basically our fourth operationalised hypothesis. Concerning both the most representative value of materialism, WELL-BEING, and of hedonism, HAPPINESS, 1989 represented a once for all change. With this, not only the fourth hypothesis is confirmed, but also the entire geometrical pattern underlying the first four hypotheses. As Figures 5 and 6 show, the decisive loss of importance of the classical socialist values can be contrasted by the strong and permanent gain in the basic materialistic and hedonistic values, while the more zig-zagged trajectory of the official public socialist values is mirrored by the opposite changes in the 'dissident' private values.

The second part of the hypothesis that assumed, in line with the first general hypothesis, a lack of corresponding change in the instrumental values closest to material well-being, is also born out by the data. AMBITIOUS, the instrumental value that both semantically and according to the results of the American data analysis is closest to the terminal value of WELL-BEING, failed to gain any importance in the post-communist years.

However, the data revealed a further characteristic of the changes that was not be predicted by the general hypothesis. Those hedonistic values that were less related to the blissful state of prosperity and contentedness (like WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS) but to a more active enjoyment of life (like PLEASURE, EXCITING LIFE and BEAUTY - the contrast is especially marked if the bracketed descriptions in the original value form are compared; see Appendix) remained more or less stable until 1996, and only changed in the last observation year. Thus, a mentality concerning the image of future as a blissful state of happiness lying just ahead was preserved, though instead of the socialist values, this state was now associated with comfort and material well-being. Furthermore, the instruments to reach this state remained still unspecified.

This change gains further importance when contrasted with corresponding losses in those two values that semantically belong here and that were among the very few values for which the changes between 1996 and 1997 proved to be significant. These are AMBITIOUS and especially WORK, the value for which the change was by far the most dramatic. During this one-year period, the average ranking of WORK lost 1.5 points. This is a huge loss in itself, and becomes even more drastic if one adds that there were no other terminal or instrumental values for which the change between 1996 and 1997 would exceed 0.5 points, and that it came on top of an already substantial loss of importance as compared to the pre-1989 levels. Thus, while WORK as a terminal value was the fifth most important during the communist period, by 1997, as compared to 1977-78, in a series of almost linear successions it lost 3.5 average ranking points and became one of the least important values by 1997 (the 14th among the 18 terminal values).

One could argue that this change only represents a reaction against the socialist regime and the excessive importance attributed there to work and production, as opposed to consumption. This is certainly true, but is only part of the story. The true relevance of this result, however, can be rendered visible from the perspective of Max Weber's sociology, especially his ideas concerning 'innerworldly asceticism' (Weber 1978: 542). According to Weber, ascetic religions and life-conducts appear in unsettled periods of transition, where they provide inner stability and reinforcement for individuals given the conditions, and also are conducive to consolidation and reconstruction at the societal level. This is particularly true in so far as the emergence of modern market capitalism is concerned. The drastic loss of importance in the value of WORK, as shown by the data, illustrates with particularly poignancy the difficulties of post-communism. The problem is not only to overcome the omnipresent weight of the past, but that its failures directly prejudicate the possibility of success in the present. These are not only the socialist values that are compromised, but the communist regime managed to compromise those very values that are vital for reconstruction and renovation after communism.

Hypothesis 5. Given the huge differences between the Hungarian and American averages in the pilot study, and the theoretically argued connection between intellectual values and the official socialist value order, the extent of a possible dislocation in these values possessed special interest concerning our general hypothesis related to continuities and discontinuities. The results

strongly support the continuity thesis at this hidden level. Far from receding, LOGICAL and especially INTELLECTUAL even gained importance after 1989. The high degree of underlying intellectualisation of the Hungarian value system continued unaltered after 1989.

The data also confirmed the two minor hypotheses. The year in which there was an exceptionally high preference for intellectual values was indeed 1993. In that year, the intellectualisation of the Hungarian value system was so thorough that INTELLECTUAL became the single most important instrumental value in Hungary, more important even than the basic ethical values of HONEST, RESPONSIBLE and COURAGEOUS, while LOGICAL ranked 7th (to recall, INTELLECTUAL and LOGICAL were ranked 15th and 17th in the US sample). By 1996, together with the running out of steam of the nostalgia for the former regime, all three intellectual values resumed their former level. In 1997, however, there was another a gain in importance, almost reaching significance with INTELLECTUAL and definitely with LOGICAL. This change can also be paired with the increase in hedonism. The importance of CAPABLE, just as that of INDEPENDENT, however, remained unchanged.

Hypothesis 6. The results for the sixth hypothesis are fairly straightforward. While some studies documented a spectacular rise in the importance of religion in other East-European countries like Russia (Greeley 1994), nothing similar has happened in Hungary. Salvation remained by far the least important terminal value in Hungary, and there were no changes after 1989 as compared to the 1982 level.

Hypothesis 7. The blend of continuity and discontinuity suggested in this case, derived from the four general hypotheses, is again confirmed by the data. The low preference granted to the two interpersonal values, FORGIVING and LOVING, was persistently maintained after 1989. In fact, the first is one of the few values where, according to the ANOVA test, there were no significant movements at all during the entire 20-year period, while this is almost true for the second as well, if we consider 1982 as an outlier case. The third value of the group, HELPFUL, the only one that was preferred more in Hungary than in the US as this was a value of interpersonal relations that not only had religious and communitarian but also socialist connotations, in fact lost considerable ground. Concerning all 18 instrumental values, the

loss of importance between 1977 and 1997 was by far the greatest, the most consistent and linear exactly in this case.

Hypothesis 8. It was assumed that to be OBEDIENT, CLEAN and POLITE are results of the civilising process that in a modern society are more or less taken for granted, and therefore changes in their importance merely follow changes in those values with which they are positively or negatively correlated. The actual data concerning these values did not contain anything counter-intuitive. In their selection, 1989 did not introduce any break. In fact, the changes between 1982 and 1990 were the smallest as compared to any other neighbouring observation years for these three values. The shifts from one year to another after 1989, on the other hand, as shown by Figure 7, strictly followed the oscillations in the preference for their semantic opposites, the intellectual values — movements which, on their own, were reduced to positive and negative communist legacies: the nostalgic return towards the past in 1993, and the two-step intensification of materialism and hedonism in 1990 and in 1997.

Hypothesis 9. In this control hypothesis, it was assumed that amidst all these changes and the legacies of the communist past, a fundamental continuity should be shown by a series of values that belong to the moral basics in any modern society, like COURAGEOUS, SELF-CONTROLLED, FRIENDSHIP, and especially HONEST and RESPONSIBLE. This hypothesis again worked quite well (see also Figure 8). Out of the five values that remained consistently stable through the twenty observation years, three belonged to this group, including the two most important ethical values, HONEST and RESPONSIBLE. Even further, there is only one outlier year for SELF-CONTROLLED, 1982, and from 1977-78 up to 1993, there was no change in the preference for COURAGEOUS either. Thus, one could say that in so far as expressed preferences for moral values are concerned, neither the communist regime, nor its collapse left a trace on the value system of Hungary. Confirming our expectations, the communist legacy is to be searched neither at the surface of consciousness, the explicit life-goals, nor at the moral basics, but at the level of the taken for granted structures of the conduct of life, or the habitus.

Hypothesis 10. The semantically homogenous set of personality values, with their opposition to each of the socialist value groups just as to the materialist

or - to a less extent - the hedonistic values, might have represented the core of an alternative, independent lifestyle, opposed to both the direct and indirect effects of the past regime. It was assumed, however, that this would not be the case, and changes in the individual values would simply mirror shifts in those other value groups with which these values showed some affinity. This hypothesis was also confirmed to a large extent, though with a major and important exception. Most conform to expectations was the behaviour of INNER HARMONY that simply followed the oscillations of the other 'dissident' values. BEAUTY certainly did not move together with INNER HARMONY, as in 1990 there was a significant, though not very huge and rather puzzling, decline in its importance. The other clear change in its preference happened between 1996 and 1997 when, as part of a general shift toward hedonism, BEAUTY also became somewhat more important.

The third value of the group, WISDOM, followed again a completely different pattern. However, this finding is important, and is perhaps the most promising sign in the otherwise rather depressing picture. This value was one of the three almost completely neglected values in Hungary in 1977-78 — a neglect that was one of the strongest contrast between the Hungarian and American value preferences. However, through a series of significant, substantial and linear shifts, by 1997 WISDOM gained more than two average ranking points (by far the greatest gain of all 18 terminal values), and took up a respectful place in the overall ranking, leaving behind the marginal position it occupied in 1977-78. Such a considerable gain in importance is especially relevant in light of the paternalism of the former regime and the degree of infantilism (Hankiss 1982) produced by it.

The steady progress of WISDOM can be further illustrated by contrasting it with the decline of WORK. As Figure 9 demonstrates, the slightest movement in the preference of one of the values is perfectly mirrored in an opposite and equal shift in the other throughout the entire 20-year span. Such a conflict or competition between these two values is all the stranger as in the first principal component of the American sample, they appear together on the same pole. Thus, it seems that the spectacular rise in the importance of WISDOM was to a large extent a compensation for the recession of the 'work ethic' in Hungary.

The general hypotheses

Given that most of the ten operationalised hypotheses were supported by the data, it is not surprising that the four general hypotheses, on the basis of which the former were constructed for the single value sets, were also met. A quick glance at Figures 3 and 4 immediately shows that the changes between the pre- and post-1989 years were much greater for the terminal than for the instrumental values. The variations in the latter were more in the form of oscillations, while preference for most of the terminal values did change in a definite direction. This perception can be confirmed by a series of t-tests. If we compare changes between 1977 and 1997, then the identity of the average can be rejected at the 0.01 significance level for 14 of the 18 terminal values, and only for 7 of the 18 instrumental values, while the null-hypothesis of identity can be accepted at the 0.05 level only for two terminal values, and for all the other 11 instrumental values.

Concerning the other three general hypotheses, we could only repeat ourselves, as for every single value associated positively or negatively with the socialist project 1989 represented a single break; for every value similarly linked to the official ideology of the regime the same was true, though with a smaller difference and with a temporary reversal in 1993; while an increase materialism and hedonism indeed proved to be the only new development counterbalancing with the loss of the socialist values. With the exception of WISDOM, there were no values showing relevant and unpredicted change.

Concluding remarks

This paper tested a series of general and specific hypotheses concerning changes in the value preferences in Hungary over a span of 20 years, using a highly complex and sophisticated value test. Yet, the majority of the hypotheses were smoothly confirmed, and these covered almost all the significant changes that occurred in 36 basic human values in six different samples. Such a high degree of predictability almost looks suspicious.

Yet, we would argue that the explanation does not lie with the data or the methods, neither is it an artifact of post hoc analysis. It is rather that the changes ultimately can be reduced not simply to ten operational hypotheses, not even to four general hypotheses, but a single overarching assertion. In the value preferences of Hungary during the past twenty years, there was only one change out of which all individual shifts in value preferences can be

derived, as if following a domino principle, and that was the collapse of the socialist project and the corresponding dissolution of communist power.

The socialist value system had two different though interlaced components, the classical and the official socialist values. By 1990, the preference for both sets decreased considerably. This was clearly a sign of the collapse of existing socialism. This phenomenon, however, also defined the direction and the modality of the opposite movements. The values that gained in importance were the opposites of these two value sets. The opposites of the classical socialist values were the values of materialism and hedonism that indeed immediately gained considerable importance in 1990. But if the direction of this change was clearly opposed to socialism, its modality was defined by the collapsed regime. Just as the 'existing socialist' project promised a blissful state in the bright communist future, the changes were accompanied in 1990 in a similar naive belief in the sudden panacea: well-being, comfortable life, happiness and contentedness. Similarly, the official socialist values were opposed by a series of dissident values that similarly gained importance in 1990.

The changes between 1990 and 1993 can almost completely be subsumed under the return of the rejected, the temporary nostalgia for the former regime. This implied no change in the first component analysed above, the contrast between classical socialism and hedonist materialism, but led to an almost full-scale reversal with respect to the second component, with both the official socialist and the dissident values returning, or at least approaching, the pre-1989 level of preferences. This time it was followed by an increased preference for another indirect impact of the former regime, the strong intellectualisation in the instrumental values, that was compensated by a mirror movement in the traditional disciplinary values that were the opposite pole of the intellectual values.

By 1996 at the latest, the post-communist bandwagon ran out of steam. This meant that the values belonging to the second component of communist and anti-communist value sets all returned to their 1990 levels. As a matter of fact, the similarity between the 1990 and the 1996 averages is striking, with hardly any significant difference. But it also means that by 1996, the two-headed socialist value groups, with their adherents and opponents, still ruled changes in the value preferences.

Even by 1997, there was little change in this regard. The only significant and marked difference, the intensification of hedonism and the further loss of the importance of a work ethic only reinforced earlier trends,

even if adding some colour to the blank bliss of 1990, and certainly gave no indication concerning the emergence of a coherent new set of values that could show a way out of the situation.

In this rather bleak picture, there is, however, one ray of hope, at least according to our data. This concerns the spectacular rise in importance of WISDOM. WISDOM is certainly a value that is much needed in the post-communist countries. However, it remains to be seen whether an increased attention paid to this most classical, and most reflexive, of all values can serve as the starting point of a development that could help the country to spin out of the communist, anti-communist and post-communist spirals.

Notes

- (1) This view was voiced in the most influential manner in the well-known works by Vaclav Havel, György Konrád and Adam Michnik about 'civil society'.
- (2) Such views were expressed in the same countries by similarly leading intellectual figures like Milan Kundera, Gyula Illyés or Czesław Miłosz.
- (3) For references on some prior empirical studies on values, see a study of values done in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s (McGregor 1991), and in Poland in 1978 (Kohn *et al.* 1997).
- (4) For further details, see also Füstös and Szokolczai (1994) and Szokolczai and Füstös (1998).
- (5) There has been some discussion concerning the ranking or rating of values (Krosnick and Alwin 1988, Suhonen 1985). Both present their own methodological complications, ipsativity (ranking) or the presence of a g-factor (rating). Rokeach required the ranking of both sets from 1 to 18. This, however, rendered the test quite complicated and time-consuming. Schwartz only asked respondents to rate his set of 56 values developed on the basis of the Rokeach test from -1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (of supreme importance) (Schwartz and Bardi 1997: 395). Though it is clear that the results yielded by both methods cannot be very different (Alwin and Krosnick 1985, Miethe 1985), ranking is required from the perspective of the theoretical considerations elaborated in this paper, and are also more suited for further, in-depth statistical analysis.

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Appendix. The Rokeach value test

A. Terminal values

1. A COMFORTABLE LIFE * (a prosperous life)
* (In Hungary: MATERIAL WELL-BEING)
2. A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)
3. HAPPINESS (contentedness)
4. WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
5. FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of the loved ones)
6. INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
7. EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
8. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT * (lasting contribution)
* (In Hungary: THE SATISFACTION OF WELL-DONE WORK)
9. AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
10. NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
12. MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
13. PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14. SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
15. FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
16. A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the art)
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
18. SALVATION (saved, eternal life)

B. Instrumental values

19. IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)
20. COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
21. BROADMINDED (open-minded)
22. OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
23. INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflexive)
24. SELF-CONTROLLED * (restrained, self-disciplined)
* (In Hungary: DISCIPLINED)
25. RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
26. CAPABLE (competent, effective)
27. CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
28. LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
29. FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
30. INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
31. HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
32. HONEST (sincere, truthful)
33. LOVING (affectionate, tender)
34. CLEAN (neat, tidy)
35. AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
36. POLITE (courteous, well-mannered)

- Note: in three cases, the re-translation of the word used in the Hungarian version into English is also given

Table 1. The first principal component

	U.S.A. HUNGARY HUNGARY HUNGARY						
	1968	1978	1982	1990	1993	1996	1997
IMAGINATIVE	.49	.58	.57	.63	.57	.54	.52
LOGICAL	.57	.47	.55	.60	.58	.51	.46
CAPABLE	.27	.35	.48	.56	.51	.46	.37
INTELLECTUAL	.52	.32	.31	.43	.35	.38	.34
BROADMINDED	.20	.34	.47	.19	.29	.13	.21
INDEPENDENT	.37	.42	.21	.28	.30	.34	.27
COURAGEOUS	.19	.33	.26	.21	.15	.20	.24
RESPONSIBLE	.23	.36	.37	.18	.34	.15	.06
WISDOM	.31	.10	.08	-.04	.11	.10	.01
INNER HARMONY	.23	.01	.04	-.02	-.05	.23	.02
WORK	.46	.03	.14	.07	.07	.10	.01
FREEDOM	.29	.42	.24	.11	.17	-.16	-.01
EQUALITY	.04	.23	.24	-.16	.04	-.31	-.19
NATIONAL SEC	.06	.38	.26	-.13	.14	-.32	-.32
PEACE	-.15	.33	.22	-.20	.07	-.36	-.33
SOCIAL RECOGN	.05	.24	.13	.02	.19	-.17	-.21
WELL-BEING	-.29	-.30	-.24	.09	-.06	.11	.26
PLEASURE	-.27	-.39	-.27	.06	-.14	.17	.41
HAPPINESS	-.34	-.40	-.31	-.07	-.24	.13	.01
CHEERFUL	-.44	-.40	-.43	-.19	-.34	.00	-.03
SALVATION	-.24	-.26	-.33	-.41	-.31	-.41	-.41
HELPFUL	-.25	-.21	-.19	-.45	-.34	-.33	-.34
OBEDIENT	-.39	-.45	-.42	-.45	-.34	-.42	-.39
CLEAN	-.55	-.48	-.48	-.41	-.44	-.38	-.24
POLITE	-.49	-.46	-.49	-.43	-.54	-.47	-.36
LOVING	-.39	-.53	-.52	-.49	-.52	-.36	-.37
FORGIVING	-.38	-.53	-.53	-.57	-.54	-.50	-.52
(eigenvalue)	3.39	3.91	3.62	3.33	3.14	3.07	2.80)

Table 2. Changes in the average ranking for each value

	1978	1982	1990	1993	1996	1997	ANOVA	linearity
1. WELL-BEING	8.2	8.7***	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.8	.001	.001
2. PEACE	4.4***	3.9***	4.9***	3.7***	4.8	4.9	.001	.001
3. HAPPINESS	6.9***	7.6***	6.0	6.2	5.9	5.9	.001	.001
4. WISDOM	13.1 *	12.7***	12.2***	11.3	11.4 **	11.0	.001	.001
5. FAMILY SEC.	5.2	5.3***	3.9***	4.6***	3.8	3.7	.001	.001
6. INNER HARMONY	8.9	8.7***	7.5***	8.4***	7.6	7.4	.001	.001
7. EQUALITY	9.4	9.1***	11.2***	10.7	11.0	11.1	.001	.001
8. WORK	7.7***	8.2***	8.7***	9.8	9.7***	11.2	.001	.001
9. EXCITING LIFE	11.7	11.9	11.7	11.9	12.0***	11.5	Note 1	n.s.
10. NATIONAL SECURITY	7.4 **	6.8***	8.1***	6.6***	8.0	7.9	.001	.001
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP	9.4 **	8.9	9.2	9.1	9.0	9.1	n.s.	n.s.
12. MATURE LOVE	10.3 *	10.7***	9.7***	10.6 **	10.0	10.3	.001	n.s.
13. PLEASURE	11.8	11.9	11.6 *	12.0	11.9***	11.3	Note 1	Note 1
14. SELF-RESPECT	9.6	9.6 *	9.9***	10.5 *	10.1	10.0	.001	.001
15. FREEDOM	8.7	8.8	9.1	9.0**	9.4	9.6	.001	.001
16. BEAUTY	13.9	13.6 **	14.2	14.0	14.1***	13.6	.001	n.s.
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION	8.8 *	9.2***	11.1***	10.5	10.6	10.5	.001	.001
18. SALVATION	15.8	15.5	15.4	15.7***	15.2	15.4	.001	.001
19. IMAGINATIVE	10.9	10.9	10.7**	10.1***	10.9	10.7	Note 2	n.s.
20. COURAGEOUS	7.2	7.4	7.3	7.4 *	7.8	7.8	Note 3	Note 3
21. BROADMINDED	10.4 *	9.9***	10.7	10.4	10.4	10.7	.001	.001
22. OBEDIENT	10.9	10.5***	11.1 *	11.6***	11.0	11.2	.001	.001
23. INTELLECTUAL	8.3***	7.6	7.4***	6.4***	7.4	7.0	.001	.001
24. SELF-CONTROLLED	9.2***	8.2***	9.1	9.0	9.3	9.0	Note 2	Note 2
25. RESPONSIBLE	6.9 *	7.3	7.2	7.2	7.1	6.8	n.s.	n.s.
26. CAPABLE	11.4	11.6	11.4	11.2	11.3	11.3	n.s.	n.s.
27. CHEERFUL	9.9	10.3 *	9.8 *	10.2 **	9.6	9.7	.001	.001
28. LOGICAL	10.9***	10.3	10.2***	9.3***	10.9***	10.0	.001	n.s.
29. FORGIVING	11.0	11.2	11.2	11.4	11.1	10.9	n.s.	n.s.
30. INDEPENDENT	9.1***	10.1 *	9.7	10.0 **	9.4	9.1	.001	.001
31. HELPFUL	7.9***	8.7	9.0	9.2	9.1	9.3	.001	.001
32. HONEST	6.7	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.4	6.6	n.s.	n.s.
33. LOVING	10.2***	11.0***	10.0	10.2	10.3	10.1	Note 4	Note 4
34. CLEAN	10.0***	9.2	9.4	9.7***	8.8 **	9.4	.001	n.s.
35. AMBITIOUS	9.5***	10.8	10.5	10.8	10.8	11.2	.001	.001
36. POLITE	10.8***	9.8	9.7***	10.4***	9.6 **	10.2	.001	n.s.

- The lower the average ranking, the greater is the relative importance of the value

- Stars between columns indicate a significant change between two years

- * significant at the 0.05 level;

- ** significant at the 0.01 level;

- *** significant at the 0.001 level;

- ANOVA test indicates significance of overall change for the six observation years

- n.s. means not significant;

- Note 1: n.s. if 1997 is omitted;


- Note 2: n.s. if 1993 is omitted;

- Note 3: n.s. if 1996 and 1997 are omitted;

- Note 4: n.s. if 1982 is omitted;

- linearity test indicates where the changes in between observations have a directionality, according to the ANOVA programme

**Figure 1. Hungary - US comparison,
terminal values**



**Figure 2. Hungary - US comparison,
instrumental values**







Figure 3. The six observation years for Hungary, terminal values




**Figure 4. The six observation years for Hungary,
instrumental values**




**Figure 5. A WORLD OF PEACE, NATIONAL SECURITY
VS.
FAMILY SECURITY, INNER HARMONY, MATURE LOVE**



**Figure 6. EQUALITY, SOCIAL RECOGNITION
VS.
A COMFORTABLE LIFE, HAPPINESS**




**Figure 7. IMAGINATIVE, INTELLECTUAL, LOGICAL
VS.
OBEDIENT, CLEAN, POLITE**




Lower numbers indicate higher preferences © The Author(s). European University Institute.

Figure 8. RESPONSIBLE, HONEST, COURAGEOUS, SELF-CONTROLLED, TRUE FRIENDSHIP



**Figure 9. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
VS.
WISDOM**





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